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Abstract  
 
We conclude that policymakers and scholars that have been most optimistic about the impact 
of digital tools have over-emphasized the role of information, specifically access to alternative 
and independent sources of information and unfiltered access to the Internet.  We argue, in 
contrast, that more attention should be paid to the means of overcoming the difficulties of 
online  organization  in  the  face  of  authoritarian  governments  in  an  increasingly  digital 
geopolitical environment.   
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Introduction 
 
In June 2010, 28-year-old Khaled Said was approached by police officers, presumably for a 
bribe, and beaten to death when he refused to give them money. A witness captured the 
image of the victim‟s bloodied face as proof of police brutality and operation outside the 
law. The image was widely circulated, and led to weeks of newspaper headlines and protests. 
The officers were later charged with illegal arrest, torture and excessive force, a rarity in 
Egypt. Human rights activists argue that Said‟s case, and the popular outrage it generated, 
could be a turning point in their long campaign against police torture. 
 
On April 6
th, 2008, the usually bustling markets and congested streets of Cairo fell silent. A 
general strike organized against President Hosni Mubarak and his government by young 
activists  using  Facebook,  matched  with  a  textile  workers'  walkout  over  low  wages  and 
soaring prices, became one of the most prominent protests in Egypt in years.  What kept this 
event from becoming a successful example of online organization was the swift arrest of the 
organizers by the Egyptian government, who were able to easily track them down via their 
digital footprints.  The public release of one of the organizers from prison, 27-year-old Israa 
Abdel Fattah, was widely distributed on YouTube. Her tearful run into her parents‟ arms and 
public promise to no longer organize such events relayed the regime‟s message clearly: it still 
has significant tools of repression at its disposal, and is not afraid to use them.  A similar 
effort a year later fell flat, in large part due to the arrest of hundreds of potential protesters 
and organizers by the police before the event.   
 
These two events illustrate both the potential impact and limitations of digital tools on social 
and political change.  Examples similar to these are taking place daily around the world.  In 
this paper, we discuss the possible impact of digital technologies in authoritarian and semi-
authoritarian regimes, and distinguish between the role these tools play in facilitating the 
flow of information, such as the photograph of Khaled Said, and in offering digital tools for 
social organizing by activist groups, for example linking together individuals via Facebook.  
While information and organizing are inextricably linked—photographs and videos play an 
important and growing role in empowering and motivating social activists—it is helpful to 
consider  them  separately  as  the  use  of  technology  entails  different  opportunities  and 
challenges for each.  
 
The spread of information has thrived in a decentralized digital environment despite the 
efforts of many governments.  Decentralized social organization is a much more challenging 
proposition.    We  argue  that  the  continued  ability  of  authoritarian  states  to  neutralize 
hierarchical civil society organizations (CSOs) implies a larger role for political change via 
other types of decentralized and bottom-up social action.  
 
Political  change  in  consolidated  democracies  is  driven  by  organizations  with  strong 
networks.  Political change in authoritarian regimes is more likely to be enabled by more 
decentralized associations with loose networks.   
 
We conclude that policy makers and scholars that have been most optimistic about the 
impact of digital tools have over-emphasized the role of information, specifically access to 3 
 
alternative and independent sources of information and unfiltered access to the Internet.  
We argue, in contrast, that more attention should be paid to the means of overcoming the 
difficulties of online organization in the face of authoritarian governments in an increasingly 
digital geopolitical environment. 
 
 
Digital Technologies, Information and Political Transitions 
 
Access  to  information  through  a  vibrant  media  system  has  long  been  recognized  as  an 
essential element in well-functioning democracies. Free access to information and a free 
press serve as a check on government, aid in transparency, reduce corruption, allow for 
debate  and  criticism  of  government  decisions,  and  provide  citizens  with  an  input  into 
political processes between elections.  Ideally, broad access to information fosters public 
debate  of  issues  of  political  salience,  and  allows  all  sides  in  those  debates  to  be  heard.  
Political scientists and media scholars have noted a shift towards greater citizen participation 
in  democracy  and  influence  in  governmental  decision-making  with  increased  access  to 
information.
1     
 
The Internet also allows new voices to enter the debate by reducing the influence of 
gatekeepers and by permitting the rise of citizen journalists to engage in previously expensive 
journalistic, transparency, or fact-checking endeavors.
2  In authoritarian regimes, bloggers, 
online forums and other forms of new media provide alternative source s of news and 
information.  This has reduced government control over information, particularly in those 
states that have exerted controls over traditional media organizations.  
 
Because  user-generated  and  virally  shared  information  is  so  effective  at  uncov ering 
corruption and allowing criticism of government policies, it is feared by authoritarian leaders 
that otherwise have a lock on the media, policy, and politics.  More voices, on more 
alternative platforms, allow citizens to criticize government, leader s, policies, and even the 
system of government itself, whether the target of the criticism is the rule of the clerics in 
Iran or the communist party in China.  In fact, the Internet may be the only avenue left for 
citizens in authoritarian regimes to influence government, fight corruption, or defend their 
rights, since local and national officials are often appointed by the central government and 
more concerned with pleasing Moscow or Beijing than occupying themselves with the 
demands of citizens.  An apt illustration is the YouTube plea by Russian police Major Alexei 
Dymovsky to President Medvedev and fellow officers to fight corruption among the widely-
despised police.
3  Although this brazen public act led to his arrest, Major  Dymovsky was 
eventually released, the charges were dropped, and several senior Interior Ministry officials 
were fired as result of this incident and other similar protests by car owners against the 
police and Russian authorities.   
                                                 
1 Michael Schudson, The Good Citizen: A History of American Civic Life (New York: Free Press, 2008); and John 
Keane, The Life and Death of Democracy (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009). Schudson uses the term 
„monitorial citizen.‟  Keane offers a related framing in his description of „monitory democracy.‟ 
2 See the work of the Media Re:Public project at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/pubrelease/mediarepublic for a 
survey of major issues associated with the rise of new media.   
3 Video available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R4vB2a15dOU&feature=PlayList&p=6EA5F7C6284CDCC7&playnext=
1&index=38 (accessed July 23, 2010). 4 
 
 
But  perhaps  the  best  illustration  of  the  threat  this  information  poses  to  authoritarian 
governments is their reaction to it.  States have made a number of efforts to rein in Internet 
speech, including Internet filtering, cyber-attacks, informal threats and intimidation, new and 
expanded legal tools for limiting online speech, and Internet surveillance. Currently, there are 
several dozen countries that filter the Internet to various degrees.  China and Iran are among 
the most aggressive in limiting access to information online.  Each employs a broad mix of 
policies in an attempt to police online speech.  They are joined by a growing set of countries 
that are applying stringent online media controls, including Burma, Tunisia, Uzbekistan and 
Vietnam, among others.
 4   
 
Despite  the  best  efforts  of  authoritarian  governments,  increased  freedom  of  expression 
enabled by the decentralized and difficult-to-control Internet has had a palpable impact on 
political processes.  However, there is much more to the picture.  
 
 
 
Information, Organizing and Areas of Contestation 
 
In  this  section  we  describe  a  simple  analytical  framework  that  describes  the  interaction 
among  civil  society  organizations  (CSOs),  media  and  governments  in  different  types  of 
regimes.  There  are  numerous  examples  of  authoritarian  states  that  seek  to  curtail  the 
influence of non-governmental actors by controlling access to media and information and by 
limiting the formation and activities of civic organizations.  The transition towards greater 
democracy  is  associated  with  expanding  free  speech  and  rights  of  assembly.    In  both 
instances,  progress  implies  the  devolution  of  power  towards  non-governmental  actors, 
increased civil liberties and concomitant restraints on government action.  
 
Many countries are at a stage in which individuals and civil society groups struggle against 
government for access to alternative sources of information and for the right to constitute 
non-governmental  organizations,  including  Egypt,  Kazakhstan,  Thailand  and  Zimbabwe. 
This  struggle  over  the  right  to  speech  and  association  corresponds  to  the  situation  in 
countries described by political scientists as thin or illiberal democracies.
5 
 
                                                 
4 These online content restriction practices are well documented.  See Ronald Deibert, John Palfrey, Rafal 
Rohozinski and Jonathan Zittrain, Access Controlled: The Shaping of Power, Rights, and Rule in Cyberspace (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 2010); and John Palfrey, Jonathan Zittrain, Ron Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski, Access Denied: The 
Practice and Policy of Global Internet Filtering (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008); additional research is available at 
http://opennet.net/.  
5 Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 1997 < 
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19971101faessay3809/fareed-zakaria/...democracy.html> (accessed March 27, 
2008); Larry Diamond, The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies Throughout the World, New York, 
NY: Times Books, 2008). 5 
 
 
Figure 1: Freedom of Speech and Association in Different Political Regimes 
 
 
 
Liberal democracies are in part defined by the strong protections they offer for the rights of 
speech and association.  It is here that we see the development of a robust and competitive 
media landscape and the formation of a strong and diverse set of civil society groups.  In 
Figure 1, movements towards the upper-right entail a shift in the focus of contestation from 
civil actors asserting their rights against resistant governments to a competition among non-
governmental actors for influence in social, economic and political processes.   
 
Improved access to information leads to an asymmetry in the evolution of information and 
civil society organizations; several countries that have more open media ecosystems by virtue 
of Internet and mobile phone communication still have not seen the same gains in the 
development of civil society organizations.  There are several examples that fall within this 
category,  including  Egypt  and  Russia.    There  are  no  examples  we  know  of  where  the 
converse is true: a country in which the right of association surpasses the right to freedom of 
speech.    This  is  notable  in  that  the  interaction  of  government  and  civil  society  groups 
parallels  the  many  complex  processes  associated  with  political  reform  and  democratic 
transition, and as such, the development of civil society seems to serve as a useful indicator 
for the level of democratic governance.  
 
A major part of the democratic transition is the fight among civil society for the right to 
engage in open and active political life.  In those countries that succeed in consolidating 
democracy, there is a political shift from governments battling the formation of civil society 
organizations to the battle among these organizations for political influence.  To understand 
the role of digital tools on democratic processes, we must better understand the impact of 
the use of these tools on the composition and role of civil society.    
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Mobs, Movements and Organizations 
 
Popular  protests,  social  movements,  and  civil  society  organizations  represent  different 
manifestations of social action and advocacy groups.  It seems natural that the Internet 
benefits  these  bottom-up,  grass  roots  groups  since,  as  Yochai  Benkler  and  others  have 
theorized, the Internet lowers the costs of participation for citizens, increases the autonomy 
of  the  individual,  gives  individuals  greater  choice  in  the  content  they  consume  and  the 
political issues they find most salient, and dilutes the power of traditional elites, gatekeepers, 
and  institutions.
6  The affordances of digital technologies influence the formation and 
activities of civil society groups, which we divide into three categories: mobs,
7 movements 
and civil society organizations (CSOs).
8   
 
 
Mobs and Episodic Popular Protests 
 
While mass popular protests are by no means a new phenomenon, several examples suggest 
that digital tools facilitate their formation.  Howard Rheingold argues that new technologies 
allow people to act in concert—in smart mobs—even when they do not know each other, 
and in ways they could not previously conceive, because the devices they use have both 
communication  and  computing  capabilities.    Two  early  examples  of  cell  phone-enabled 
smart mobs are the 1999 anti-globalization street protests in Seattle and the massive anti-
Estrada protests in the Philippines that forced the President from office.
9  A more recent 
example is the No Mas FARC protest, in which a young Colombian was able to successfully 
mobilize 13 million people to join in protests in Colombia and several other countries using 
Facebook.  This was an important event given the prior reluctance of many to publ icly 
denounce the FARC and fear of reprisals.    In general, online mobilization of the „mob‟ sort 
is episodic and more likely to be spontaneous.   
 
 
Social Movements 
 
Charles Tilly describes social movement as campaigns with a clear, long-term objective to 
„right  a  wrong‟  that  often  has  been  inflicted  on  a  well-specified  population.    Social 
movements consist of multiple means-ended actions, whose goal is to correct the wrong 
suffered.  Tilly  describes  the  actions  of  social  movements  as  symbolic,  cumulative,  and 
indirect.  Unlike flash mobs or smart mobs, social movements hold out almost no hope that 
any  single  event  will  achieve  their  stated  objective  of  ending  an  injustice  or  persuading 
authorities to enact a needed law.
10  While social movements operate for a longer period of  
                                                 
6 Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2006). 
7 We use mobs, flash mobs and smart mobs interchangeably in this paper to reflect online organized popular 
protests.   
8 Clay Shirky, Here Comes Everybody: The Power of Organizing Without Organizations (New York: Penguin Press, 
2008). 
9 Howard Rheingold, Smart Mobs: The Next Social Revolution (Cambridge: Perseus Publishing, 2003). 
10 Charles Tilly, “Social movements and (all sorts of) other political interactions—local, national, and 
international—including identities,” Theory and Society 27 (1998) 7 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Three Models of Social Organizing - Mobs, Movements and CSOs 
 
 
 
time than mobs, they are rarely permanent, and frequently break up when they achieve their 
objectives,  although  sometimes  they  morph  into  persistent  civil  society  institutions  or 
political parties, if favorable political and regulatory conditions exist.   
 
A  leading  practitioner  and  scholar  in  the  field,  Marshall  Ganz,
11  argues  that  social 
movements  emerge  as  a  result  of  the  efforts  of  purposeful  actors  (indivi duals  and 
organizations) to form new relationships, assert new public values, and mobilize political, 
economic, and cultural power to translate these values into action. 12  They differ from 
fashions, styles, or fads (viral or otherwise) in that they are coll ective, strategic and 
organized.13 They differ from interest groups in that they focus not so much on allocating 
goods as on redefining them. 14  Initiated in response to conditions that adherents deem 
intolerable, social movement actors make moral claims base d on new personal identities, 
collective identities, and public action.15  
 
A much studied and often-cited example of a successful social movement is the civil rights 
movement in the United States during the 1960s.  More recently, Juan Cole and others have 
                                                 
11 Marshall Ganz, Presentation given at Berkman Center for Internet & Society event “Building a Framework 
for the study of the Internet & Democracy,” 2008, Budapest, Hungary. 
12 Thomas Rochon, Culture Moves: Ideas, Activism, and Changing Values, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1998).  
13 Gary T. Max and Doug McAdam, “Collective Behavior in Oppositional Settings: the Emerging Social 
Movement” in Collective Behavior and Social Movements (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall). 
14 Mario Diani, “The Concept of Social Movement”, in Readings in Contemporary Political Sociology, edited by Kate 
Nash, (New York: Blackwell Publishing, 2000), 158-176. 
15  Eric Foner, The Story of American Freedom, (New York: W. W. Norton, 1998); Theda Skocpol, Marshall Ganz, 
and Ziad Munson, “A Nation of Organizers: The Institutional Origins of Civic Voluntarism in the United 
States”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No. 3 (Sep., 2000), pp. 527-546; Marshall Ganz, “Left Behind”: 
Social Movements, Parties, and the Politics of Reform” Unpublished Paper, presented at the Annual Meeting 
of the American Sociological Association, August 2006, Montreal.  
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argued persuasively that the Green Movement in Iran is best viewed as a social movement.
16  
It is hard to imagine a successful social movement today that would not seek to leverage the 
Internet and social media to achieve their short and long term goals.  P resident Obama‟s 
election campaign may be seen ultimately as one of the first successful Internet-driven social 
movements.   
 
Social movements differ from mobs in a number of ways.  First, they are focused on a single, 
long-term goal.  Second, they may take years to achieve that goal, so they are far more 
persistent and focused than smart mobs or one off political protests.  Third, they will have 
more identifiable leadership to drive the agenda and mobilize participants. Fourth, they will 
tend to have more developed organizational structures.   
 
 
Civil Society Organizations 
 
There is a broad consensus among democracy scholars that a vibrant civil society is a critical 
component  of  consolidated,  liberal  democracies.    Civil  society  can  be  defined  as  the 
engagement of citizens in activities as part of formal groups and associations, which exist 
and  operate  outside  the  government.    Examples  include  trade  unions,  professional 
associations,  church  groups,  student  organizations,  and  many  others.    As  Tocqueville 
famously observed in 19
th century America, the social, commercial, political, religious and all 
other  manner  of  associations,  large  and  small,  trivial  and  serious,  in  which  Americans 
constantly  joined  and  participated  were  a  cornerstone  of  American  democracy.
17  More 
recently, Robert Putnam has decried the drop in civic participation in the US, because he 
believes that the dense networks of civic engagement that these groups create build 
interpersonal trust and social capital among members, which makes cooperati on for mutual 
benefit in other areas of social and political life more likely.
18  This social capital, he further 
argues, bolsters the performance of both the polity and the economy: “Strong society, strong 
economy; strong society, strong state.”
19   
 
Samuel Huntington has noted the important role of CSOs in the „third wave‟ of democratic 
transitions, from trade unions and the Solidarity movement in Poland, to policy changes by 
the Catholic Church during the Second Vatican Council.
20  Larry Diamond has also observed 
that in most democratic transitions, civil society played a crucial role in mobilizing and 
articulating public pressure for democratic change.  He writes that although there is variation 
in each democratic transition, a substantial combination of ci vil society actors—including 
trade unions, student organizations, churches, professional associations, women‟s groups, 
human rights organizations, ethnic associations, underground media, and various groups of 
intellectuals, journalists, merchants, and peasants—combined to coerce or force the exit of 
                                                 
16 Juan Cole, “The Greens are a Movement, Not a Coup,” Informed Comment,  
http://www.juancole.com/2010/06/the-greens-are-a-movement-not-a-coup.html (accessed July 16, 2010) 
17 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, translated, edited and with an introduction by Harvey C. 
Mansfield and Delba Winthrop (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000) 489. 
18 Robert Putnam, “Bowling Alone: America‟s Declining Social Capital,” Journal of Democracy 6.1 (1995) 
19 Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1993). 
20 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, OK: University 
of Oklahoma Press, 1991) 26. 9 
 
authoritarian leaders.
21  Scholars of this bent argue that precisely because civil society exists 
outside of the state, they can more easily mobilize resistance against authoritarian regimes.
22 
 
The primary attrib ute that sets CSOs apart from mobs and social movements is their 
permanence—or at least expected permanence.  They also have all the trappings of any other 
traditional offline institution:  leadership, staff, advisory boards, office space, and today, an 
online presence and social media strategy.  While all of these organizing models may entail a 
mix of bottom-up and top-down hierarchical structures, CSOs tend to have a higher degree 
of top-down organization and mobs the least.   
 
While we find it is analytically useful to classify online organizing in the taxonomy described 
above,  these are not hard and fast categories.  There are examples of smart mobs that 
become social movements and movements that develop into more permanent civil society 
organizations.    An  interesting  example  is  MoveOn.org.    Started  by  two  Silicon  Valley 
entrepreneurs,  Joan  Wade  and  Wes  Boyd,  MoveOn.org  began  as  an  online  petition  to 
protest the impeachment of President Bill Clinton.  It has since evolved into a multi-issue 
organization that today is closer to a political umbrella institution that advocates progressive 
policy issues, as well as a political action committee, which collects and distributes political 
donations to candidates it supports.   
 
 
Online Organizing and Contentious Politics 
 
Flash mobs, social movements and CSOs in consolidated democracies can use digital tools 
to motivate participants, organize protest actions, gain new adherents, capture attention of 
the mainstream media, and otherwise exert political influence, thanks in large part to strong 
protections for freedom of speech and association, and the high levels of Internet and cell 
phone penetration.  It is this type of environment that allowed the Obama campaign to 
develop  a  highly  sophisticated  online  organizing  strategy  that  combined  top-down 
hierarchical organizing with the energy and enthusiasm of bottom-up emergent structures. 
 
The  Internet  and  digital  tools  notwithstanding,  hierarchical  organizations  with  strong 
networks—the  mainstay  of  civil  society  in  consolidated  democracies—are  not  a  viable 
option in authoritarian states. CSOs, whose offline activities are already highly regimented 
and watched by the state, are not exempt from the same scrutiny and restrictions in their use 
of digital tools. CSOs are easy targets; their staff can be harassed or arrested and registration 
permits can be revoked if they stray outside the lines of accepted political organization.  The 
difficulty faced by foreign and domestic CSOs in Russia that deal with politically contentious 
issues, including human rights and free media, is instructive.      
 
The 2007 Burma protests occupy the grey area between a flash mob and a social movement.  
Instigated by rising gas prices, protests escalated and encompassed thousands from across 
society, notably including a large number of monks.  Cell phones and video cameras played a 
critical role in reporting the events to the world. This reporting by citizen journalists and 
activists undoubtedly fed a sense of international support and would have strengthened the 
                                                 
21 Diamond, The Spirit of Democracy.  
22 Michael Foley and Bob Edwards: “The Paradox of Civil Society” Journal of Democracy 7(3) 1996.   10 
 
resolve of protestors. There is little evidence to suggest that digital tools were widely used to 
organize the protests.  
 
The experiences from the Green Revolution in Iran follow a similar pattern.
23 Although 
there was a great deal of exciteme nt about the role of Twitter in Iran after the presidential 
election, more recent evidence indicates that Twitter conversation about the Iranian protests 
occurred mostly among those in the West, and most likely was not used by Iranians to 
organize.  Instead, Twitter and other social media were used to report protest events as they 
unfolded,  replacing  the foreign  press  and  also  creating  international  support  for  the 
movement.  The greatest impact of the Internet on the Green Movement may have been the 
YouTube video that documented the death of Neda Agha-Sultan.  This likely served as a key 
„mobilizing event‟ that spurred on the social movement by offering a rallying cry and a 
common narrative among its participants.    
 
Efforts at digital organizing in Iran do not appear to have been effective. In the run-up to 
the disputed election, the Mousavi campaign sought to use Facebook to rally supporters. 
The government responded by simply blocking access to Facebook. Online communities 
that congregate at a single URL are easily dismantled; organizations that rely on a centralized 
nodes and hierarchical structures are trivial to break up.   
 
The activities of social movements will gain influence only to the extent that they are able to 
avoid the scrutiny and controls of the state.  The use of digital tools does not lessen the 
ability of the state to crack down on leaders and disrupt social organizing. In fact, the ability 
of the state to carry out surveillance of online networks may make these communities more 
vulnerable than their offline counterparts.  Although they differ in their approach to online 
speech, the attitude of states like Iran, China and Russia towards real political competition is 
unanimous:  it is treated as a threat, and those political groups that are seen as a significant 
threat to the regime are vigorously resisted, if not quickly eliminated or marginalized.  In 
Russia, the democratic opposition has an active presence in the blogosphere and other social 
media,  but  only  marginalized  opposition  political  parties  are  allowed  to  participate  in 
elections, and their minority status is ensured through electoral legislation and other coercive 
methods.  In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood is prohibited from participating in elections, 
although their online presence is tolerated along with other opposition groups.   
 
A possible alternative for CSOs and social movements in hostile online environments is to 
operate under the veil of anonymity. However, anonymity diminishes the effectiveness of 
the very factors that facilitate effective social and political organizing identified by Tilly, 
Ganz and others: leadership and displays of unity and commitment.  It is therefore not 
surprising  that  there  are  no  examples  of  influential  political  movements  comprised  of 
anonymous participants.  These meager alternatives greatly diminish the potential for online 
organizing in states that are intent on preventing such activity.    
     
Smart mobs, however, particularly where they emerge organically and take governments by 
surprise, may be possible in all but perhaps the most restrictive authoritarian regimes.  In a 
                                                 
23 John Palfrey, Bruce Etling and Robert Faris, “Reading Twitter in Tehran?: Why the Real Revolution is on the 
Streets—and Offline.” The Washington Post, June 21, 2009, available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/06/19/AR2009061901598.html (accessed July 23, 2010).  11 
 
few cases, the ability of a mob to quickly overwhelm unprepared governments has been 
successful.  The cell phone-aided resignation of Estrada in the Philippines is perhaps the best 
example  of political  change that was preceded by mass protests; other offline examples 
include the quick fall of the governments in Serbia and Kyrgyzstan. The result of other 
protests, such as the anti-FARC protests, is less clear; although the large turnout may have 
had an impact on the positions and long-term strategies of both FARC and the Colombian 
government. In other cases, short-lived protests may induce little or no change.  The failure 
of the 2007 protests to topple the regime in Burma is an apt example.   
 
 
The Uncertain Future of Digital Organizing  
 
The relative success of decentralized digital reporting has supported the monitorial citizen 
and improved transparency and accountability in all but the most digitally repressed states. A 
logical consequence of this in closed regimes is a greater sense of outrage over corruption 
and political  malfeasance and a greater appetite for social  action. As more  citizens gain 
access to the Internet, membership in latent social and political communities will grow: a 
larger cohort of potential political activists to be triggered by the next manifestation of social 
injustice caught on a cell phone or video camera. When combined with a continued restraint 
on  organized  social  action,  this  suggests  that  we  may  see  an  upturn  in  bottom-up 
spontaneous protests  focusing on specific high-profile issues,  local  events and the  most 
visible abuses of power. Should this prove true, there are a number of possible outcomes. 
We could see authoritarian governments that are more responsive to the expressed needs of 
their  people  with  moderate  improvements  in  policy  or  governance.    Other  possible 
outcomes include more rapid containments of civil actions or a more frequent turnover in 
governments.  We would almost certainly see increased efforts to contain information flows 
and to preemptively disarm, or co-opt, grass roots political action.   
 
The  prospect  of  a  proliferation  of  political  flash  mobs  is  not  an  entirely  rosy  one.  As 
Rheingold and others have observed, digital technologies can be used just as easily by those 
with nefarious intentions as those acting in the public interest. Poorly organized mass actions 
are highly unpredictable and easily manipulated.  In Kenya, for example, text messages were 
used to direct attacks against minorities during a period of post-election violence in 2007.
24   
 
A challenge for improving the prospects of digitally -assisted political reform in closed 
societies that must rely on decentralized networks is to adapt, emulate and transfer the 
benefits of highly organized civil society groups, as bottom -up decentralized organizing is 
more  likely  to  survive  in  repressive  regimes.  Compared  to  more  tightly  structured 
hierarchical organizations, flash mobs do not have the same level of leadership, discip line, 
long-term planning and ability to incorporate prior experience. In other words, flash mobs 
do not deliberate; they do not debate the alternatives and select pragmatic and well informed 
strategic approaches.   
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An  interesting  prospect  is  that  digital  communities  will  emerge  to  serve  as  venues  for 
deliberation  and  to  provide  collective  leadership  for  smart  mobs.  Currently,  the  closest 
manifestation to such a decentralized deliberative body is the blogosphere. The Egyptian 
blogosphere is a possible example.  It is comprised almost entirely by those in opposition to 
the  government,  and  includes  a  range  of  opposition  voices,  including  secular-minded 
bloggers  connected  to  the  Kefaya  movement,  more  conservative  Muslim  Brotherhood 
bloggers, and those dedicated to stopping torture and abuse by police.
25  Many of these 
communities exist both online and off, some loosely affiliated and some with tighter 
networks.  These groups serve as ideal outlets for sharing stories and exchanging visions of 
change.  These online communities in Egypt promote reform and serve as a rallying point 
when key events take place such as the arrest of bloggers and activists. Reform movements 
may be pushed forward by ideas and reports of injustice, such as the treatment of Khaled 
Said,  but  they  are  sustained  by  communities,  such  as  these  loosely  affiliated  online 
communities in Egypt. It is an open question whether these communities can emerge as 
coherent social movements while remaining decentralized bottom-up institutions.  
 
The  Russian  d rivers‟  movement  offers  another  example  where  online  organizing  is 
contributing to a social movement, but also shows that change will most likely be limited to 
improved „responsive authoritarianism‟ instead of fundamental political change.  The core of 
this movement includes car clubs, such as the Federation of Car Owners, that organize 
largely online.  They have organized successful protests against increased taxes, traffic police 
corruption,  police  scandals,  and  a  series  of  fatal  auto  accidents  involving  wealthy  and 
politically connected drivers who often escape prosecution for their crimes.  Indeed, there 
have  been  a  number  of  cases  where  the  victims  are  blamed,  despite  video  or  witness 
evidence  to  the  contrary.    One  famous  incident  involved  a  senior  executive  of  a  large 
Russian oil company, which spawned a video appeal by a popular rap musician that had 
600,000 hits in just a few days.  Video and witness evidence are gathered, shared widely on 
YouTube,  debated  in  blogs  and  on  other  online  forums,  and  eventually  picked  up  by 
mainstream media where they generate further outrage.  These protest events appear to have 
contributed (or at a minimum, hastened the president‟s decision) to fire 16 high-level police 
officers and order a restructuring of the Interior Ministry, one of Russia‟s „power ministries.‟  
Following the „horns of wrath‟ caravan protests in a number of Russian cities, drivers also 
successfully halted a doubling of taxes on car owners.  While this type of change is limited, 
and will likely not lead to a change in regime type or greater democratization in Russia, it is 
significant in a country where there are few remaining opportunities for bottom up political 
action, and the Internet is a fundamental part of it.
26   
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The Internet has an important role in increasing information sharing, access to alternative 
platforms, and allowing new voices to join political debates.  The Internet will continue to 
serve these functions, even with state pushback, as activists devise ways around state online 
restrictions.  Conditions that contribute to success are likely determined not by the given 
technological  tool,  but  by  human  skill and  facility  in  using  the  networks  that  are  being 
mobilized.   Further, those movements that are most successful appear to combine the best 
of „classic‟ organizing tactics with the improvisation, or „jazz,‟ that is enabled by new Internet 
tools; for example, constantly updated mobile mapping tools used by campaign volunteers 
that target swing voters in US elections, a classic campaign tactic made easier and more 
volunteer  centric  by  technology.    It  is  less  clear  how  far  online  organizing  and  digital 
communities  will  be  allowed  to  push  states  toward  drastic  political  change  and  greater 
democratization,  especially  in  states  where  offline  restrictions  to  civic  and  political 
organization are severe.  As scholars, we ought to focus our attention on the people involved 
and their competencies in using digitally-mediated tools to organize themselves and their 
fellow  citizens,  whether  as  flash  mobs  or  through  sustained  social  movements  or 
organizations, rather than the flow of information as such. 